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Hedonism, as a theory of the good life and as foundation for ethics, claims that only 
pleasure has intrinsic value and only pain has intrinsic disvalue. Hedonism in this naive form 
has  been  rightly criticized due to its counter--‐intuitive implications, but several 
philosophers have recently tried  to refine the theory so as to keep its intuitive aspects  
while  avoiding  common  objections.  Feldman (2004)  proposes  a  variant  entitled  Intrinsic  
Attitudinal  Hedonism,  according  to  which  the  good  life doesnot consist in experiencing 
pleasure, but engaging in activities and experiences that you attitudinally take pleasure in. 
The move towards a higher--‐order, reflective account of  pleasure already takes care of 
some problems, but in order to deal with so--‐called arguments from  false pleasures (Kagan, 
1992; Nozick, 1993), Feldman also introduces what he refers to as Truth--‐Adjusted Intrinsic 
Attitudinal Hedonism (TAIAH). This entails  that  attitudinal  pleasures  must  be  grounded  in 
true states of affairs, or at least that the strength of attitudinal pleasure is partly 
determined by its truth conditions. In this paper, I will build on Feldman’s theory, but 
argue that intrinsic attitudinal hedonism should be adjusted for confidence rather than 
truth, yielding Confidence--‐Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism (CAIAH). In line with 
Feldman, CAIAH holds that the good life consists in having activities and experiences that 
you reflectively take pleasure in (not necessarily at the time of doing the activity). but 
adds that you need to be confident about that which you take attitudinal pleasure in 
– or at least that the strength of attitudinal pleasures is partly determined by your 
confidence that 
they correspond to something real, that they are sustainable, that they are reciprocal, and 
a number of other determinants of confidence.. The degree of confidence can be 
determined by truth, meaning that self--‐deception will usually lead to cognitive dissonance, 
which by its very nature erodes confidence. However, CAIAH allows for confident yet 
possibly erroneous beliefs to constitute well-‐‐ being. Thus, CAIAH, in  contrast with  most 
other theories of the good  life, allows for spiritual and other unfalsifiable beliefs to 
constitute well--‐being regardless of whether they are objectively true. It also allows for a 
range of potentially false yet confident beliefs to determine happiness, including love, 
trust and suspended disbelief. CAIAH is initially a “thin” theory of the good life, which 
means that it tries to set out formal conditions for a good life without specifying concrete, 
objective requirements. However, both the reflective nature of attitudinal pleasures and 
the confidence adjustment entails several concrete implications – especially for ethics of 
technology. 
 
A first implication is that technological mediation often determines confidence. For 
instance, several philosophers have criticized virtual relationships for being inferior to actual 
relationships (see  e.g. Cocking and Matthews (2000)). According to CAIAH, there is 
nothing inherently problematic about virtual relationships, and they can  give rise to  
many of the  same attitudinal pleasures, but virtual relationships are inferior when it 
comes to the confidence they provide. Having lived with someone and experienced their 
person in different circumstances allows for a level of confidence unattainable in virtual 
environments. It is this difference in confidence that in practice make actual relationships 
more conducive to well--‐being than virtual ones. Closely related, and relevant to many 
online activities, ‘trust’ is not necessarily grounded in true states  of  affairs.  Still,  diminished  
trust  online comes with reduced opportunity to be confident about the corresponding  
activities.  CAIAH  also entails that the online information glut, including increased exposure 
to alternative lifestyles and increased knowledge of the suffering of others, may lead to 
reduced confidence in the life we have chosen for ourselves. Moreover, CAIAH forms the 
theoretical basis for an approach defended elsewhere, entitled Prudential--‐Empirical Ethics 
of Technology (PEET) (Søraker, J. H., 2012). This approach evaluates the impact concrete 
technologies may have on our subjective well--‐being by drawing on research from ‘positive 
psychology’, a field that studies subjective well--‐being empirically (cf. Peterson (2006)). In 
the full paper, I will defend CAIAH more substantially, outline the close connection between 
CAIAH and PEET, and describe the normative recommendations that follow (e.g. regarding 
authenticity, education, social isolation, skill--‐demanding activities and a range of other 
activities that have been made possible by and/or profoundly redefined by online activities. 
In conclusion, the purpose of the full paper is to defend CAIAH as a general theory of the 
good life that solves several counter--‐intuitive implications inherent to other theories, and 
to show how it is substantive enough to provide normative recommendations, especially for 
the role of technology in a good life. 
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